John P. Sampson v. Milton R. Goff, individually and as trustee of Milton R. Goff Trust, an unicorporated association : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
John P. Sampson v. Milton R. Goff, individually and
as trustee of Milton R. Goff Trust, an unicorporated
association : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John T. Anderson; Biele, Haslam & Hatch; Attorneys for Respondents.
Craig S. Cook; Attorney for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Sampson v. Goff, No. 880257 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1029
WfttEF 
UTAH 
DOCU.VfcN 1" 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. s?tna^-r.ft 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN P. SAMPSON, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent, 
and 
MILTON R. GOFF, individually and 
as trustee of MILTON R. GOFF 
TRUST, an unincorporated 
association, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PAUL H. RICHINS; RICHTRON INC., 
a Utah corporation; RICHTRON 
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation; RICHTRON GENERAL, 
a Utah corporation, and, 
FRONTIER INVESTMENTS, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants, Respondents, 
and Cross-Appellants. 
Court of Appeals No. 
880257-CA 
Supreme Court Case Nos. 
860565 and 860570 
CROSS-APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from a Judgment of the 
Second Judicial District Court, Davis County 
State of Utah 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Presiding 
Craig S. Cook, Esq. 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Attorney for Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent 
John T. Anderson, Esq. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
50 West Broadway, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN P. SAMPSON, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent, 
and 
MILTON R. GOFF, individually and 
as trustee of MILTON R. GOFF 
TRUST, an unincorporated 
association, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PAUL H. RICHINS; RICHTRON INC., 
a Utah corporation; RICHTRON 
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation; RICHTRON GENERAL, 
a Utah corporation, and, 
FRONTIER INVESTMENTS, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants, Respondents, 
and Cross-Appellants. 
CROSS-APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from a Judgment of the 
Second Judicial District Court, Davis County 
State of Utah 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Presiding 
John T. Anderson, Esq. 
Craig S. Cook, Esq. BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
3645 East 3100 South 50 West Broadway, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Court of Appeals No. 
880257-CA 
Supreme Court Case Nos. 
860565 and 860570 
Attorney for Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent 
Attorneys for Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
SCOPE OF REPLY 
ARGUMENT I • . 
Page 
1 
2 
THE OVERWHELMINGLY RECKLESS AND PREDATORY 
NATURE OF SAMPSON'S CONDUCT REQUIRES THE 
IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A. Sampson's Conduct is the Type of 
"Extraordinary Event" Mandating the 
Imposition of Punitive Damages . . 
B. In Applying a Requirement That 
Sampson Could Be Liable For Punitive 
Damages Only Upon a Showing of 
Intentional Misconduct, The District 
Court Improperly Heightened the 
Applicable Standard For the Award 
of Such Damages , 
C. Sampson's Conduct Was 
Particularly Contemptible In Light 
of His Fiduciary Duty Toward The 
Richins Parties 
D. Sampson Misconstrues The 
Standard for the Award of Punitive 
Damages 
ARGUMENT II 
SAMPSON HAS FAILED TO REFUTE THE RICHINS 
PARTIES' CLAIM TO DAMAGES IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL 
TO ALL MONIES THAT HE COLLECTED AND DISBURSED 
DURING THE FIRST 28 MONTHS OF HIS UNLAWFUL 
CONTROL OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 
CONCLUSION 
5 
6 
- l -
CASES CITED 
Cases Page 
Bassan v. Investment Exchange Corp. 
524 P.2d 233, 238 (Wash. 1974) 6 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc. 
675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) 3 
Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment, Co. 
655 P.2d 1125, 1131 (Utah 1982) 5 
First Security Bank of Utah v* J.B.J. Feedyards 
653 P.2d 591, 598-99 (Utah 1982) 4 
Harline v. Daines 
562 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977) 6 
Kessler v. Rogers 
542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975) 4 
Lachmunb's Estate 
170 P.2d 748 (Ore. 1946) 5 
Tomlin v. Ceres Corporation 
507 F.2d 642, 648 (5th Cir. 1975). . . . . . . . 6 
Wroblewski v. Brucher 
550 F. Supp. 742, 746 (W.D. Okla. 1982) 6 
Others 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 908 3 
7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law, Section 119 (1980).. 5 
-ii-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN P. SAMPSON, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent, 
and 
MILTON R. GOFF, individually and 
as trustee of MILTON R. GOFF 
TRUST, an unincorporated 
association, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs • 
PAUL H. RICHINS; RICHTRON INC, 
a Utah corporation; RICHTRON 
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation; RICHTRON GENERAL, 
a Utah corporation, and, 
FRONTIER INVESTMENTS, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants, Respondents, 
and Cross-Appellants. 
CROSS-APPELLANTS ' REPLY BRIEF 
SCOPE OF REPLY 
This reply brief will address two issues raised by cross-
respondent, John P. Sampson ("Sampson"), in his brief: 
1. Whether the district court applied an incorrect 
standard in concluding that no award of punitive damages should 
be assessed against Sampson. 
2. Whether the district court's refusal to award damages 
Court of Appeals No* 
880257-CA 
Supreme Court Case Nos 
860565 and 860570 
to the Richins Parties in an amount equal to all monies collected 
and disbursed by Sampson during the first twenty-eight months of 
his unlawful control of the Limited Partnerships should be 
reversed. 
ARGUMENT I. 
The Overwhelmingly Reckless and 
Predatory Nature of Sampson's 
Conduct Requires The Imposition 
of Punitive Damages 
A. Sampson's conduct is the type of "extraordinary event" 
mandating the imposition of punitive damages. In tiis cross-
respondent's brief, Sampson correctly observes that an award of 
punitive damages is an "extraordinary event" which should be 
awarded only in "exceptional cases." (Sampson Brief, p. 34). It 
is difficult, however, to imagine a case more exceptional than 
this one: a case in which a lawyer purposely allows numerous 
default judgments to be entered against his clients (R. 2081); a 
case in which a lawyer receives and wrongfully disburses client 
funds (R. 2051); a case in which a lawyer purchases, and later 
sues on, a judgment obtained against his former clients (R. 2050-
52, 2059, 2124, 2202-03); a case in which a lawyer conceives, 
implements and executes a six year plan to seize control of his 
former clients' business interests; (See generally Richins 
Parties' Brief, pp. 6-23); and, a case in which a lawyer 
solicits the IRS' cooperation in liquidating those business 
2 
interests- (Exhibits 298 and 300; R. 2125-26). 
Clearly, contrary to Sampson's assertion, this is not a case 
of "mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of judgment and the like" 
which Section 908 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests 
does not justify the imposition of punitive damages* As such, 
the Richins Parties have satisfied the threshold requirement of 
demonstrating the existence of an event so extraordinarily 
shocking as to require the imposition of exemplary damages. 
B. In applying a requirement that Sampson could be liable 
for punitive damages only upon a showing of intentional 
misconduct, the District Court improperly heightened the 
applicable standard for the award of such damages. In its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court 
stated, "[h]e [Sampson] should have known the law, but I do not 
believe he intentionally violated it." (R. 2187) (Emphasis 
added). The Utah Supreme Court, however, has expressly 
determined that willful intent on the part of a defendant is not 
required to support a punitive damages award. In Behrens v. 
Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) the 
court held that: 
"A defendant's conduct must be malicious qr_ 
in reckless disregard for the rights of 
others, although actual intent to cause 
injury is not necessary." (Emphasis added). 
Notably, the test announced by the court is in the disjunctive, 
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allowing a plaintiff to premise punitive damages on a showing of 
malicious conduct or reckless disregard for the rights of others. 
Furthermore, the district court stated that, "As wrong as 
Sampson was in many of the things he did, I think he believes 
himself to be right in doing what he did and the wgty he did 
them." (R. 2187). Again, however, the Utah Supreme Court has 
long held that punitive damages are available regardless of the 
defendant's state of mind. In Kessler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 
(Utah 1975), the court pointed out that, "[d]espite 
[defendant's] argument that he was but attempting to enforce what 
he believed to be his legal rights" the evidence showed that his 
conduct was willful and warranted punitive damages. Id. at 359. 
It was the defendant's "wrongful conduct" that caused the court 
to sustain the punitive damages award. Id. 
In this case, the district court's apparent rejection of 
this principle and its substitution of a qualitatively steeper 
standard of intentional conduct constitutes reversible error. 
C. Sampson's conduct was particularly contemptible in 
light of his fiduciary duty toward the Richins Parties. 
Among the various factors to be considered for a punitive 
damages award is the relationship between the parties. First 
Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards. 653 P.2d 591, 598-99 
(Utah 1982). The case at bar involves an attorney/client 
relationship. That relationship has been characterized as "one 
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of extreme personal trust and confidence . . ." In re 
Lachmunb's Estate, 170 P.2d 748 (Ore. 1946). Moreover, "the 
relationship between an attorney and his client is highly 
fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and 
confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and 
good faith. It is purely a personal relation, involving the 
highest personal trust and confidence . . ." 7 Am. Jur. 2d 
Attorneys at Law, Section 119 (1980). And, even if the 
attorney/client relationship has ceased, the attorney's loyalty 
to the client is not discharged. Id. at Section 120. Sampson's 
conduct, standing alone, was reckless; undertaken in the context 
of the attorney/client relationship, it was predatory and 
abusive. The district court failed to attach sufficient weight 
to the existence of that relationship, and the incredible extent 
to which that relationship was abused, in declining to award 
punitive damages. 
D. Sampson misconstrues the standard for the award of 
punitive damages. In his brief, Sampson argues that because he 
"acted in good faith" the district court properly denied the 
Richins Parties' claim for punitive damages. (Sampson Brief, p. 
37). However, a good faith standard has never been the primary 
measure of whether punitive damages are properly recoverable. 
Indeed, the element of bad faith is only one small component of 
that standard. Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment, Co., 655 P.2d 
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1125, 1131 (Utah 1982). The district court's unwillingness to 
apply that principle must be rectified. 
ARGUMENT II. 
Sampson Has Failed To Refute The Richins 
Parties1 Claim to Damages In An Amount 
Equal To All Monies That He Collected 
And Disbursed During The First 
28 Months of His Unlawful Control 
of The Limited Partnerships 
The law is, of course, well settled that "a limited partner 
can claim no interest or right in the assets, properties or 
rights of the partnership." Wroblewski v. Brucher, 550 F. Supp. 
742, 746 (W.D. Okla. 1982). Accord, Harline v. Dairies, 562 P.2d 
1120 (Utah 1977); Tomlin v. Ceres Corporation, 507 F.2d 642, 648 
(5th Cir. 1975); Bassan v. Investment Exchange Corp., 524 P.2d 
233, 238 (Wash. 1974). Nothing in the limited partnership 
agreements at issue in this case alters that principle, Each of 
those agreements provided that: 
"The general partner [the Richtron Companies] 
shall have full charge of the management, 
conduct, and operation of the partnership 
affairs in all respects and in all matters . 
. . No limited partner shall take part in 
the conduct or control of the affairs of the 
partnership. . ." 
Therefore, once the district court correctly concluded that 
only the lawfully installed general partner (Richtron, Inc. or 
Richtron General) had authority to collect limited partnership 
funds, R. 2210, and that Sampson's use of those funds was ". . . 
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unauthorized as Richtron, Inc., remained general partner with 
complete control over partnership affairs," R. 2236, the full 
amount of diverted funds -- $645,101.38 -- should have been 
awarded to the Richins Parties.1 
Interestingly, in his brief, Sampson seeks to side-step that 
issue by arguing without any accurate reference to the record 
that those monies were used " . . . for the benefit of the limited 
partnerships." (Sampson Brief, p. 39). In doing so, however, 
Sampson conveniently ignores the fact that Section 48-1-35 of the 
Utah Uniform General Partnership Act establishes a clear 
mechanism for seizure and possession of partnership property: 
(i) payment to the incumbent general partner of the value of such 
partner's interest in the partnership or (ii) procural of a court 
approved bond. There is nothing in the record to suggest that 
Sampson ever understood, let alone complied with, that provision. 
That failure renders him personally liable for all damages 
occasioned by his unlawful control of the Limited Partnerships' 
property. The district court's conclusion to the contrary must 
1
 This is the amount taken by Sampson between June 1980 
and November, 1982, the period during which the district court 
determined he had no colorable authority to serve as general 
partner. (R. 2123). On October 29, 1982, he arguably acquired 
such authority through his purchase at an IRS tax sale of 
various assets of the Richtron Companies. Thus, the Richins 
Parties are seeking on this issue an award of damages only for 
the 28 month period of Sampson's undeniably illegal assumption of 
control of the Limited Partnerships. 
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be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse 
the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions 
to (i) determine the amount of punitive damages to be extracted 
from Sampson and, (ii) enter judgment in favor of the Richins 
Parties for the additional principal sum of $645,101.38 plus 
interest• 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /_o_ of September, 1988. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
By v^r^-^i^^J^^: 
JOHftv T. ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Respondents and 
Cross-Appellants 
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